Abstract-This paper presents a novel distributed control strategy for large-scale deployment of flexible demand in power systems. A game theoretical setting is adopted, modeling the loads as rational players that aim to complete an assigned task at minimum cost and compete for power consumption at the cheapest hours of the day. The main novelty is the analysis of power systems with congestion: the proposed modeling framework envisages heterogeneous groups of loads that operate at different buses, connected by transmission lines of limited capacity. The locational marginal prices of electricity, different in general for each bus, are calculated through an optimal power flow problem, accounting for the impact of the flexible devices on power demand and generation. A new iterative scheme for flexible demand coordination is analytically characterized as a multivalued mapping. Its convergence to a stable market configuration (i.e., variational Wardrop equilibrium) and global optimality are analytically demonstrated, for any penetration level of flexible demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of the proposed control strategy are discussed, evaluating their performance with simulations on the IEEE 24-bus system.
flexibility of demand can be exploited to provide ancillary services [2] . On the other hand, the growing penetration of flexible loads has certain potential drawbacks [3] , [4] . For instance, the diffusion of flexible loads will change consumption patterns, potentially causing new demand peaks and significant voltage deviations in the power grid. Proper coordination of flexible appliances can avoid such undesirable effects and, at the same time, facilitate the integration of renewables, reduce operating cost, and improve stability and reliability of the grid [5] , [6] .
B. Relevant Work
A consistent amount of research has been carried out to achieve flexible demand coordination, evaluating centralized and decentralized approaches. Centralized control strategies such as [7] and [8] envision a central entity that collects information from all flexible appliances and centrally determines their power consumption in order to optimize some global objectives. However, these schemes become complicated to implement and computationally expensive for large numbers of flexible appliances, making them unsuitable for big and complex systems. Better scalability is obtained with distributed schemes that also preserve the privacy of the appliances. Multiple decentralized approaches have been considered, including Lagrange relaxation methods [9] , congestion pricing [10] , and stochastic pricing [11] . Game theory has also been extensively applied to devise distributed control strategies for coordination of flexible loads [12] - [18] . The general approach adopted in these papers is to model the flexible loads as self-interested players that compete for energy consumption at the cheapest prices. On this basis, distributed control actions are designed in order to converge to a stable market outcome (characterized as a Nash equilibrium) and to possibly maximize social welfare.
It is worth noting that all these works consider a unique price function throughout the grid, repartitioning total costs among the users proportionally to their fraction of total power consumption [12] or assuming that the electricity price is some monotone increasing function of total power demand [13] - [18] . This choice captures a fundamental property of electricity markets, where the marginal cost of generation is increasing and higher supply corresponds to higher prices. However, the proposed modeling frameworks only consider distribution networks [13] , [17] , [18] or conduct a whole-system analysis [14] - [16] that does not account for any underlying network topology. Moreover, the pricing schemes in [12] - [18] neglect two fundamental characteristics of realistic power grids: the presence of multiple buses (connected by transmission lines of limited capacity) and, as a result, the arising of different locational marginal prices (LMPs) throughout the system. Recent work has proposed novel modeling approaches that incorporate the transmission network, investigating the impact of EVs [19] , [20] , and more generally demand response [21] , [22] on LMPs. The interactions between distribution and transmission and the impact of uncertainties have also been assessed in [23] and [24] , respectively. However, different from [12] - [18] , all of the cited papers [19] - [24] do not provide any theoretical guarantee on the convergence to equilibrium and social optimality of their coordination scheme.
C. Contributions
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the research approaches presented in [12] - [18] and in [19] - [24] . In particular, the framework presented in this paper combines a rigorous theoretical analysis (guaranteeing convergence and optimality of the proposed coordination scheme) with explicit modeling of the transmission infrastructure (accounting for the underlying network topology and assessing the impact of demand response on LMPs and generation costs).
These results are obtained considering heterogeneous priceresponsive loads operating at distinct buses of the power system. The congestion of transmission lines is taken into account and the LMPs at each bus are characterized as the Lagrange multipliers associated to a linearized ac optimal power flow (ACOPF) problem, whose solution depends on the operation strategy of the flexible loads. The proposed coordination scheme for flexible demand relies on the preliminary findings of [25] and envisions iterative better-response updates by the price-responsive appliances, which are characterized as the evolution of a multivalued mapping. The formulation and the results of [25] have been expanded to explicitly consider a more complex pricing structure with LMPs. In order to account for the congestion of the transmission lines and the potential price jumps that this might cause, a more general class of aggregative games has been considered and a novel notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium is introduced. Through the application of Lyapunov tools, it is demonstrated that the proposed coordination scheme converges to an equilibrium and achieves global optimality for any penetration level of flexible demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of the proposed scheme and simulative results on the IEEE 24-bus system are also provided.
D. Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the chosen power system model and the properties of the linearized ACOPF solution. Section III presents the modeling of the flexible appliances and the considered game-theoretical setup. Section IV proposes a distributed scheme for flexible demand coordination and demonstrates its convergence and optimality properties. The performance of the proposed control strategy, including its robustness with respect to uncertainties, is evaluated in simulation in Section V, while Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II. MODELING OF OPTIMAL POWER FLOW AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
The considered power system is composed by a finite set M = {1, . . . , M} of distinct buses. 
The linearized ACOPF in (1) and (2) determines active (and reactive) power generation G (and GQ), voltage angles θ, and squared voltage magnitude v 2 that minimize generation costs. The function f m (g) in (1) is the cost of generating g units of power at bus m and is assumed to be strictly convex. Constraints (2a) and (2b) are the linearized expressions of active (and reactive) power flow P l,t (and Q l,t ) on line l, where g l and b l are conductance and susceptance of the line. Details on the expressions and linearization of the power losses terms P L l,t and Q L l,t are in [26] . Constraints (2c) and (2d) are the nodal balance expressions for active and reactive power. The last sums in their right-hand side represent the power flows on the shunt elements, where G and B are the real and imaginary part of the admittance matrix. Bounds on G, GQ, v 2 , and θ are imposed in (2e)-(2h). The capacity constraint P 2 l,t + Q 2 l,t ≤S 2 l of line l at time t is represented in (2i) by a piecewise linearization [27] , which approximates the circle P 
A. Electricity Prices
In order to characterize the LMPs associated to a certain vector of demand values D, some properties of ϕ(D) are preliminarily discussed. 
where ϕ m ,t (D) andφ m ,t (D) are the left and right partial derivatives of ϕ(D) with respect to D m ,t . The electricity price p m ,t is chosen as the Lagrange multiplier associated to the power balance constraint (2c), i.e., the marginal cost of providing an additional unit of power at bus m at time t. Within the considered theoretical framework, this price corresponds to the partial derivative presented in (3). To account for the points of nondifferentiability of the optimized cost ϕ(D), the following two distinct price signals are considered:
Under the current formulation,p m ,t is the marginal cost of providing an additional unit of power at bus m. Conversely, p m ,t represents the marginal saving of reducing by one unit the power supplied to bus m.
We wish to emphasize that the double price formulation in (4) is not only a mathematical technical detail, but it also represents a crucial element in correctly characterizing price variations and the cost minimization of the loads. In particular, the proposed formulation allows to formally account for the price "jumps" resulting from a marginal generator reaching its maximum capacity or the saturation of some line. In these cases, the electricity price will vary discontinuously. Considering the corresponding value of the demand vector D, the quantities p m ,t (D) and p m ,t (D) will represent the different price values at bus m and time t before and after the jump. It follows that D ∈ D and the minimized cost function ϕ(D) will not be differentiable in these particular cases.
The price discontinuities are particularly relevant in the cost minimization problem of flexible demand. Each load, in order to correctly evaluate its cost variation, will have to consider p m ,t when its power consumption is reduced (thus, reducing total demand D) andp m ,t when its power consumption is increased (thus, increasing total demand D). This is consistent with the equilibrium formulation in Definition 2, where the considered prices are selected accordingly to the sign of the associated power scheduling variation.
B. Local Monotonicity of Prices
As a preliminary step in the definition of the proposed control scheme and in the theoretical assessment of its convergence and optimality properties, an important monotonicity property of the prices in (4) is presented. Proof: See Appendix B. From the above-mentioned considerations, the following power quantity can now be introduced.
Definition 1: Consider a demand vector D ∈ R M T , a bus m ∈ M , and two time instantst, t ∈ T . The quantity (D, m,t, t) is defined as follows:
whereê m ,t is the unit vector of the standard orthogonal basis associated to bus m and time t.
In the above-mentioned definition, is the positive amount of power that can be swapped between t antt in order to minimize their price differential. From the monotonicity of p m ,t andp m ,t , whenp m ,t ≤ p m ,t the quantity corresponds to the maximum power swap between t andt that preserves their original price order.
Remark 1: The price monotonicity introduced in Proposition 2 is used to formally prove convergence to equilibrium of the proposed control scheme. This convergence result can still be proven in more general contexts, where the considered OPF problem is not convex and the price monotonicity is not guaranteed. In this case, it is sufficient to verify (21a) through a Taylor expansion of the minimized cost ϕ and replace in (5) by a suitable "sufficiently small" power variation.
III. MODELING OF FLEXIBLE DEMAND
This section presents the modeling framework of the flexible loads. These are described as price-responsive rational agents, characterizing their interactions through a game-theoretical setup and introducing the concept of variational Wardrop equilibrium.
A. Individual Devices and Impact on Aggregate Power Demand
A population N = {1, . . . , N} of price-responsive devices is considered, denoting by μ j ∈ M the power system bus in which the flexible load j ∈ N operates. The flexible appliances are considered as self-interested rational agents that operate over the discrete time interval T = {1, . . . , T }. In particular, each appliance j ∈ N schedules its power consumption over time
T in order to complete an assigned task at minimum energy cost. The task of agent j can be unequivocally characterized by the following three quantities: 1) Its rated power P j .
2) The total energy E j required to complete its task.
3) The set of time instants A j ⊆ T during which it is available to operate. Any feasible power consumption profile u j guaranteeing task completion for agent j belongs to the set U j , defined as
where Δt denotes the time discretization step and 1 S (t) is the indicator function calculated as
The equality in (6) ensures that the total energy consumed by appliance j is equal to the energy required to complete its task.
The inequalities in (6) impose that the (positive) power consumption of appliance j cannot exceed its rated power P j for t within the availability interval A j and must be zero for t outside it. The proposed notation can be extended, representing by u = [u 1 , . . . , u N ] ∈ R N T the scheduled power profile of the whole population and by U = U 1 × · · · × U N the corresponding feasibility set.
Assumption 1: The power scheduling problem admits at least one solution. In other words, the parameters (P j , E j , A j ) of each device j are such that U = ∅.
In order to account for the impact of the flexible appliances on the power system quantities discussed in Section II, it is sufficient to replace the demand vector
where d m ,t is the known inflexible demand at bus m at time t. Remark 2: Consistently with previous works [19] - [22] , [24] on the subject, the proposed modeling framework directly considers the impact of flexible demand at a transmission level, and it does not specifically account for the effects on the underlying distribution network. As discussed in Section VI, an explicit characterization of the distribution network will be a key direction for further research in this area.
B. Game-Theoretical Framework and Wardrop Equilibrium
The coordination of the power scheduling by the flexible appliances is analyzed within a game-theoretical framework. Each device is modeled as a self-interested player that aims to minimize its individual cost in response to broadcast price signals. The following competitive game is considered.
1) Players: The set N of flexible devices.
2) Strategies:
The set U j of feasible power profiles for a single flexible device j ∈ N . 3) Objective function: Energy cost of task completion. For a certain price signal p : T → R + , the following expression can be provided for the cost C j of device j:
Within this framework, the flexible loads are rational agents competing for power consumption at cheap prices. In the following section, we propose a coordination strategy of the devices that ensures convergence to a stable market configuration. This is expressed as a variational Wardrop equilibrium, defined next.
Definition 2: The scheduled power consumption u * ∈ U ⊂ R N T corresponds to a variational Wardrop equilibrium if the following holds for all u ∈ U :
This definition represents an extension of the Wardrop equilibrium concept (or aggregative equilibrium), which has already been applied in the context of price-responsive demand coordination [14] , [29] , [30] . The general idea in these works is to characterize the equilibrium as a fixed point: the power scheduling of each device is optimal for a certain price signal and, at the same time, the aggregate power consumption of all loads induces that very same price. This concept satisfyingly approximates a Nash equilibrium if the effect of the individual player on the global quantities of the system is negligible. This is true in the present case of large-scale deployment of flexible demand, as the power consumption of a single device is orders of magnitude smaller than total power demand.
Definition 2 proposes a generalization of the Wardrop equilibrium concept for the case of nondifferentiable global cost functions and discontinuous LMPs, which, as underlined in our analysis, naturally arise from line congestion and maximum generation capacity when the proposed linearized ACOPF is considered. The left-hand side of (10) denotes the energy cost variation ΔC j incurred by the single device j if it switches from the candidate equilibrium solution u * j to some other feasible power profile u j ∈ U j . This cost variation is the difference between the costs of increased power consumption at certain time instants (priced atp * ) and the savings from reduced power consumptions at other times (priced at p * ). At equilibrium, as imposed in (10), the cost variations ΔC j associated to a different strategy are always greater than or equal to zero. Note that, if the minimized generation cost ϕ(D) is a function differentiable everywhere, the signalsp * and p * are the same, leading to the classical definition of Wardrop equilibrium. The second part of the fixed point condition is given by (11) , which ensures that the overall power consumption of the devices leads to same prices p * and p * considered in (10). In order to derive an equilibrium condition that is equivalent to the definition in (10) , to be used in the subsequent analysis, the following function is introduced:
The sign of γ indicates the possibility by the single load to reduce its cost. If γ(u, j,t, t) > 0, the device j operating at bus μ j , starting from a schedule u, can reduce its cost by swapping power from time t = t to time t =t. In fact, considering the nonnegativity of the factors (P j − u j,t ) and u j,t in (12), the condition γ(u, j,t, t) > 0 implies three distinct inequalities as
The conditions-mentioned above indicate, respectively, the following. 1) An advantageous price difference exists between t andt.
2) The device j can consume more power at timet.
3) The device j can consume less power at time t. The last two points make the power swap between t and t feasible, while the first one makes it cost-reducing for the device j. It follows that an equilibrium is reached when γ is always nonpositive and no device can perform a cost-reducing power swap. This is formalized by the following result.
Proposition 3: The scheduled power consumption u * ∈ U corresponds to a variational Wardrop equilibrium, as presented in Definition 2, if and only if
Proof: See Appendix C
IV. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION OF FLEXIBLE DEMAND
This section proposes a distributed control strategy for flexible demand coordination. This is initially characterized in Section IV-A as a multivalued mapping, theoretically demonstrating with Lyapunov techniques and convexity arguments its asymptotic convergence to a variational Wardrop equilibrium that is also socially optimal. An equivalent pseudocode algorithm representation is given in Section IV-B, whereas Section IV-C discusses the implementation of the proposed control strategy in practical contexts, envisioning a distributed scheme where individual appliances iteratively update their power scheduling, on the basis of broadcast price signals, in order to reduce their energy cost.
A. Power Update as Evolution of Dynamical System
The power scheduling update of the flexible appliances is described by the following discrete-time dynamical system:
where F : U → U is a multivalued correspondence and u(k) denotes the scheduled power consumption of the flexible loads after k iterations of the proposed coordination strategy. In order to characterize the multivalued mapping F , the following quantities are preliminarily introduced:
The set S j (u) associates to a device j ∈ N the pairs of time instants s j = (t j , t j ) that maximize the function γ under the current u and can therefore be considered for cost-reducing power swaps. Considering the constraints in (6) and Definition 1 for , the function Δ returns the maximum feasible power swap that device j can perform betweent and t while preserving their original price order. The multivalue mapping F j associated to the power scheduling update of a single device j is now defined as
where the single component f (17), corresponding to the updated power consumption of device i at time t, has the following expression when s j = (t, t):
When the mapping F j (u) in (17) is applied, a single element s j = (t j , t j ) is selected within the set S j (u) and the device j swaps power from time t j tot j . The amount of swapped power corresponds to Δ, defined in (16) . The last two terms in its minimum function ensure that the updated power scheduling remains feasible, whereas the first term , defined in (5), guarantees that the power swap is performed (i.e., Δ > 0) only if there is an advantageous price differential between the time instantst j and t j . All other devices i ∈ N \{j} maintain their previous power scheduling. The complete multivalued correspondence F in (14) can now be expressed as the composition of N mappings F j , iterated over the whole population of flexible appliances N = {1, . . . , N} as
The evolution of the power scheduling u(k) according to the proposed update strategy can now be characterized as follows. Definition 3: Given the dynamical system (14) , with F defined in (19) , its solution set Ψ can be expressed as
Some fundamental properties of the solution set Ψ are now demonstrated, showing that the proposed power update strategy (characterized by the mapping F ) always converges to the variational Wardrop equilibrium presented in Definition 2. This is proved with Lyapunov arguments, selecting the optimized generation costs ϕ(D) as the considered Lyapunov function. Similarly to the Lyapunov stability theorem in the discrete-time case, we aim to demonstrate that the function ϕ(D) is always nonincreasing when evaluated over the state trajectories (19) of system (14) , as shown in Proposition 4. This implies convergence to equilibrium-as demonstrated in Theorem 1.
The first step in our analysis is the following result: Proposition 4: For the optimized generation cost ϕ presented in (1), evaluated along any solution ψ ∈ Ψ, it holds that
Proof: See Appendix D. Proposition 4 shows that the proposed power update of the flexible appliances, characterized by the multivalued mapping F , has the fundamental property of reducing the total generation costs of the system at each iteration. As a result, the minimized generation cost ϕ asymptotically converges to some finite value ϕ ∞ . In addition, from (21b), the proposed strategy updates the power scheduling of the appliances only if this ensures a reduction of total costs. The main equilibrium and optimality results can now be provided.
Theorem 1: Let Ω * denote the set of variational Wardrop equilibria introduced in Definition 2. Indicating by |x| Γ the distance between some element x ∈ U and the set Γ ⊆ U , it holds that
Proof: See Appendix E. This result ensures that the proposed scheme asymptotically converges to the set of variational Wardrop equilibria. In other words, when the final power scheduling is applied, each device has no unilateral interest in modifying its power consumption in order to reduce its energy cost. This property holds for any grid topology, any penetration level of flexible demand, and all parameters of the price-responsive appliances. Global 
2) Power scheduling update. The scheduled power profiles of the individual appliances are iteratively updated:
END FOR END WHILE
3) Final results. The Wardrop equilibrium solution is equal to the power scheduling at the last iteration:
optimality of the Wardrop equilibrium can also be demonstrated under some mild assumptions. Theorem 2: If the optimized generation cost is differentiable at the Wardrop equilibrium u * ∈ Ω * , i.e., D = D(u * ) / ∈ D in (3), the following optimality property is verified:
Proof: See Appendix F. The theorem shows that any Wardrop equilibrium u * is also socially optimal if the function ϕ(D) is differentiable at D = D(u * ). In these cases, there exists no feasible power scheduling u ∈ U whose associated generation cost ϕ(D(u)) is lower than ϕ(D(u * )) obtained at equilibrium.
B. Pseudocode and Flowchart Representation
The power scheduling update described by (19) and (17) can be performed through Algorithm 1, graphically summarized by the flowchart in Fig. 1 . The Initialization phase of the algorithm sets the power scheduling u(0) of the whole population to some initial value u 0 . In the Power scheduling update phase, each full execution of the FOR cycle in step 2.b) corresponds to the application of the mapping F in (19) . In particular, each single iteration with index j is equivalent to the application of F j in (17) . First, the time instantst * , t * ∈ A j , which maximize γ are selected. Then, if the maximized γ is positive, the device j can reduce its energy cost by shifting the amount of power δ from 
C. Implementation Scheme
Algorithm 1 constitutes a pseudocode representation of the iterated application of the multivalued mapping F in (19) . It details the steps required to calculate the modified power schedule by each individual load and specifies the stopping criterion for the iterative updates. In the rest of this section, we present an implementation scheme for the application of this algorithm in a distributed way, considering iterated broadcast of prices and individual devices that autonomously modify their power schedule to reduce their costs. Relying on a bi-directional communication scheme between the system operator and the flexible loads, the operations associated to each step of the algorithm can be performed as follows.
1) Initialization phase: Each device j determines an initial feasible power consumption profile u j (0) = u 0 j ∈ U j . This can be obtained by broadcasting a certain price signal p to all the appliances and letting each device j schedule its power consumption u j (0) = u 0 j in order to minimize (9) . The scheduled power profiles u(0) are communicated to the central entity, which determines the resulting aggregate power demand D(u(0)) through (8).
2) Power scheduling update: Implementation of the WHILE cycle in step 2 can be performed as follows. a) The price signalsp μ j (D(u(k))) and p μ j (D(u(k))), i.e., the LMPs at bus m = μ j associated to the current demand profile D are calculated according to (4) and broadcasted to device j. This device can then independently determine the time instantst * , t * ∈ A j of an advantageous power swap reducing its energy cost (as in step 2.b.iii of Algorithm 1). b) The device j applies (16) and independently calculates δ in step 2.b.iv of Algorithm 1, i.e., the maximum amount of power consumption that can be swapped in its power schedule from time t * tō t * . c) The device j communicatest * , t * , and δ to the central entity, which in turn calculates the new demand profile D(u(k + 1)) and the convergence flag conv.
3)
Final results: When Algorithm 1 converges to a Wardrop equilibrium, as proven in Theorem 1, the WHILE cycle described above is concluded and the devices cannot further reduce their energy costs. Their final power profiles u * j will be equal to u j (k) at the last iteration k.
D. Methods for Faster Algorithm Convergence
The coordination scheme in Algorithm 1 has been chosen for its simplicity and because it directly maps the multivalued function F , introduced in (19) to analytically describe the scheduling update of the loads. Some alternative approaches that can ensure faster convergence are discussed below. 1) Multiple power swaps: Each load performs multiple simultaneous power swaps between distinct pairs of time instants that are characterized by advantageous price differentials. Within this framework, the convergence and optimality properties presented in Theorem 1 and 2 are preserved. 2) Best response strategy: Each load directly applies its costminimizing schedule in response to a price broadcast, with no impact of its previous power scheduling. This approach has exhibited fast convergence to equilibrium in simulation, but such result has not been formally proved. 3) One-shot strategy: With this method, discussed in detail in [15] for a simplified pricing structure, the flexible loads are coordinated through the broadcast of a single price signal (different in general for each load). These prices are calculated by the central coordinator, which receives the characteristics and task parameters of all the devices and internally emulates Algorithm 1 to calculate the final equilibrium solution. It should be mentioned that, in this case, one-shot convergence is obtained at the expenses of the loads' privacy.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The performance of the proposed control scheme is assessed in simulation on the IEEE 24-bus system [31] . The generation cost f m (g) at each bus m is assumed to be a quadratic function of the power generation g, i.e., f m (g) = a m g 2 + b m g. A diagram with relevant quantities of the considered system is shown in Fig. 2 and all other parameters can be found in [31] . The inflexible active demand profiles d m ,t are derived from historical data and are in general different for each bus. Their values are shown in Fig. 3 (left -black dashed lines) . It is assumed that all the inflexible loads operate at 0.95 lagging power factor and that, at each bus, the feasible range of voltage magnitudes is between 0.9 and 1.1 p.u. Additionally, power losses are neglected. A future scenario with high penetration of electric vehicles is considered and N m ⊆ N represents the subset of N m devices operating at bus m (chosen values of N m are shown in Fig. 2) . Each vehicle j is modeled as a load with unity power factor [32] . The required energy E j of all devices j ∈ N m is chosen according to a Gaussian distribution with mean x E m and standard deviation δ E m . In addition, it is assumed that all the vehicles at bus m have the same rated power P m . For instance, the energy and power parameters for the EVs at bus 1 are selected as follows:
The final time T = 24 h and time discretization step Δt = 0.25 h are chosen for the considered time horizon. It is assumed that each vehicle j can operate in a continuous time interval [t j , t j + d j ]. The equivalent availability window A j of the single device j can be expressed in discrete time as It should be noted that the normal distributions used to generate the EVs parameters E j , t j , and d j are properly truncated and rescaled in order to ensure feasibility and well-posedness of the considered scheduling problem.
A. Algorithm Implementation
The coordination of the flexible devices has been performed with Algorithm 1. The initial condition u(0) = u 0 in Step 1) envisages constant power profiles for all loads. In the power update of Step 2), single devices have been sequentially selected at each iteration. A single power swap is performed as detailed in step 2.d) before moving on to the next device.
The final results of the proposed coordination scheme, denoted by the star superscript, have been compared with the scenario price-greedy (PG). In this latter case, a more naive approach is applied and each appliance j ∈ N m determines its power consumption profile according to the pricep m (d), i.e., the electricity price when only inflexible demand d is considered. The total power consumption of the flexible appliances in this scenario is denoted as u PG . The demand and price profiles obtained with the two policies mentioned above are compared in Fig. 3 . For length reasons, a limited number of relevant buses is considered. In the present case study, the two price signalsp and p introduced in (4) coincide in all cases and therefore only the signalp is shown. The most relevant trend that we wish to emphasize is that the electricity pricep m (D(u * )) obtained with the proposed control strategy is consistently flatter thanp m (D(u PG )). All the electric vehicles schedule their charge between 22:00 and 7:00 h, when the electricity price at their bus is constant and minimum. As expected, at equilibrium no device can exploit any price differential to reduce its energy cost and therefore has no unilateral interest in changing its final power consumption profile. Note that the same flattening trend, albeit on a lesser scale, appears in the demand profiles D m (u * ), which do not exhibit the significant rebound peaks of D m (u PG ). The flattening of the demand profiles D m (u * ) in Fig. 3 is only partial since the iterative power update of the devices is based on differences in LMPs which, in general, do not exclusively depend on local demand but are also affected in nontrivial ways by the demand values at other buses.
The generation profiles obtained with the proposed control scheme and under the PG scenario are compared in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that, differently from the significant variation experienced in the PG case, the presented coordination algorithm completely flattens generation at each bus during the night time.
Some relevant examples of apparent power flows (obtained with the proposed algorithm and in the PG case) are represented in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that, in general, there are reduced variations over time when the final configuration with D = D(u * ) is considered. Note also that line 27 always operates at its maximum capacity.
To assess the impact of generation capacity limits and lines congestion on the LMPs, LMPs at buses 7 and 8 for D = D(u * ) are plotted in Fig. 6 . A few interesting trends can be underlined. As expected, the two pricesp 7,t (D(u * )) andp 8,t (D(u * )) will be the same when there is no congestion on the line 11 connecting them (see top-left plot of Fig. 5 ). As soon as congestion appears on line 11, the prices become different: the LMP at bus 8 will vary continuously and its variations will be linked with the ones of other buses (i.e., buses 9 and 10), which are connected to bus 8 by lines 12 and 13 (not congested). Conversely, in this situation any additional unit of power at bus 7 can only be provided by generator 7 at its marginal generation cost, which leads to the negative price jump ofp 7,t (D(u * )) (black trace).
B. Robustness With Respect to Uncertainties
The proposed control strategy operates under the assumption that the inflexible demand d is known without uncertainties, and it does not explicitly account in its formulation for forecast errors on demand and generation. In order to quantify the performance degradation when these elements are included in the case study, it is assumed that the coordination of the price-responsive loads is performed with an estimated of inflexible demand, which in general is different from the actual demand profile d. Denoting byd m ,t the estimated inflexible demand at bus m and time t, we haved
where η m ,t represents the forecast error on inflexible demand at bus m at time t. Assuming that renewable generation has zero marginal cost and it is always dispatched first, the quantity η m ,t can equivalently represent a negative error forecast in renewable generation. The error forecast η m is characterized as a random walk η m ,t+1 = η m ,t + σ m e t , where e t represents uncorrelated white noise with zero mean and unitary variance. With this formulation, consistently with basic models for wind error forecast, η m ,t is a random variable with zero mean and standard deviation equal to σ m · √ t. To account for error forecast correlation at the different buses due to geographical proximity, two independent noise signals e t are considered for the South buses (e.g., buses [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and for the North ones (buses [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . The value of σ m at each node m is obtained as the rescaling of a unique parameter σ by the fraction of total demand at that node.
The coordination algorithm has been applied by considering the inflexible demand estimated rather than the actual profile d, denoting byũ * the power scheduling of the appliances at the final equilibrium solution. In this case of imperfect information, the total generation costs will be equal to ϕ(D(ũ * )) and the energy costC j sustained by the single device j will correspond to:
The optimal schedulingũ * has been calculated over L = 50 realizations of the estimated inflexible demand profiled. The resulting cost C av (average ofC j over all devices and demand realizations) and the total generation costs ϕ av [average of ϕ(D(ũ * )) over all demand realizations] are plotted in Fig. 7 as a function of the standard deviation parameter σ.
As expected, for increasing values of σ (corresponding to higher forecast errors), the average energy cost C av for the individual load and the average total generation costs ϕ av increase. However, it can be seen that the performance degradation re- 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel distributed scheme for the coordination of large populations of flexible electric loads. A comprehensive modeling framework is proposed for demand response operating in multibus power systems, explicitly accounting for the congestion of transmission lines and the impact of flexible demand on the LMPs at each bus. The main original contribution is a theoretical analysis that provides guarantees of convergence to a stable market outcome and global optimality, for any grid topology and penetration level of flexible demand. In addition, a double pricing structure and a novel concept of variational Wardrop equilibrium are proposed to characterize stable market configurations in the case of discontinuous price functions. Practical implementation of the presented control scheme is discussed and its performance is evaluated in simulation on the IEEE 24-bus system with high penetration of electric vehicles.
The analysis in this paper only considers the impact of priceresponsive loads on the transmission infrastructure. Future work will expand the existing modeling framework to account for the effect of flexible demand on the distribution network. The approach proposed by [23] will initially be investigated, adding the contribution of flexible demand to the base load and adopting proper simulation tools to quantify the resulting load flows. A theoretical study will also be conducted, evaluating whether the presented results of convergence and optimality can be extended to a double-level network topology, which accounts for transmission and distribution at the same time. Finally, the possibility of conducting a stochastic optimization, which explicitly models and accounts for uncertainties on demand and generation, will be explored.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Two key points are preliminarily shown. First, the objective function in the right-hand side of (1) is strictly convex given the strict convexity of each f m . Second, let G (D) denote the set of feasible solution vectors-including active and reactive power generation (G, GQ), voltage angle, and squared magnitude (θ, v 2 )-that fulfill (2) for a certain D ∈ R MT . The graph of G is convex. This property follows from the linearity and convexity of the constraints in (2) . As a result, the strict convexity of ϕ(D) with respect to D follows from the maximum theorem under convexity [33] .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For simplicity, we consider the simplified case in which the minimized generation cost ϕ(D) in (1) is always differentiable. As a result, prices at bus m at time t are unique and equal tō
From Proposition 1, we have that ϕ(D) is a strictly convex function and therefore its Hessian matrix H is positive definite, with H 0. From basic properties of positive definite matrices, the following holds for each diagonal element of H:
To verify the proposition statement, it is sufficient to check the positivity of the following partial derivative:
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 Each feasible power schedule u j for agent j can be expressed as the sum of the strategy u * j at the candidate equilibrium solution plus a finite number Q of elementary variations:
where each term δ q : T → R, for some Δ q > 0 and (t q , t q ) ∈ A j × A j has the following expression:
The above-mentioned expressions can represent all the elements u j ∈ U j , since these are characterized by the same fixed sum. In addition, one can assume without loss of generality that each δ q corresponds to a feasible power swap of Δ q between the time instantst q and t q . As a result, it must hold that
If one substitutes (29) in (10), the cost variation ΔC j can be written as
The inequalities (a) and (e) follow from (3) and (4), (b) and (d) are a result of Proposition 2 and (c) holds by construction of (D(u), μ j ,t j , t j ), as expressed in (5) in Definition 1. We can conclude that (36a) holds as a result of (41) and (42). Similar arguments can be used to also verify (36b), thus, proving (21a). Proof of (21b): Since ϕ is nonincreasing when any F j is applied, (36b) must hold for all j ∈ N when u = ψ(k) and ϕ(ψ(k + 1)) = ϕ(ψ(k)). As previously proved, this implies Δ(u, μ j ,t j , t j ) = 0 for all j and therefore ψ(k + 1) = ψ(k).
Proof of (21c): This property straightly follows from (21a) and the boundedness of ϕ.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider the omega-limit set Ω(ψ) associated to the solution ψ ∈ Ψ and defined as follows:
The theorem is verified if the following holds for all ψ ∈ Ψ: Accounting for the compactness of U , it is sufficient to show that the graph G j of the individual mappings F j in (19) is closed [37] . The graph G j can be expressed as
where U (s j ) ⊆ U has the following expression:
One can verify that G (s j ) is closed since the state-space subset U (s j ) is closed (defined by a set of nonstrict inequalities) and (17) is continuous with respect to u. This means that also G j is closed (union of a finite number of closed sets), thus proving the closedness of G , the upper semicontinuity of F and condition (44a).
Condition (44b):
To verify that each point in Ω(ψ) also belongs to the set of variational Wardrop equilibria Ω * , it is preliminarily shown that, as a result of (21c) and continuity of ϕ and D, the following holds for all u ∞ ∈ Ω(ψ):
Moreover, as a result of the outer-semicontinuity of the mapping F , weak-forward invariance of Ω(ψ) is also guaranteed [35, Ch. 6.3.3] :
As (47) establishes that all points u ∞ ∈ Ω(ψ) have equal generation costs ϕ ∞ and ϕ is nondecreasing along all trajectories ψ, there must exist
If this were not the case, from (19) and (21a), we would have
which contradicts (48) if one considers (47). As γ is maximized by all s ∈ S 1 (u ∞ ) from (15), we have γ(u ∞ , 1,t, t) ≤ 0 ∀s = (t, t) ∈ S 1 (u ∞ ) (50a)
where (50b) also implies F 1 (u ∞ ) = {u ∞ }. Recursive application of the same arguments for j = 2, . . . , N yields γ(u ∞ , j,t, t) ≤ 0 ∀s j = (t, t) ∈ S j (u ∞ ) ∀j ∈ N . (51)
The proof of (44b) is concluded by noting that, from (15), conditions (51) and (13) in Proposition 3 when u * = u ∞ .
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Given the differentiability of ϕ(D(u * )), the following gradient vector can be derived from ( 
We recall that any u ∈ U can be characterized as the sum of u * and a finite number Q of power swaps δ q , as presented in (29)- (30) 
Consider now the equilibrium condition (13) at the equilibrium u * ∈ Ω * , thus proving (54) and the theorem.
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